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Preliminary remarks 
This paper aims at giving an overview of the operative actions, diversion 
plans and manipulative use of mass-media undertaken by Hungary against the 
Vatican during the Cold War in the period between the opening of the II Vati-
can Council and Karol Wojtyła’s election. Ostpolitik has for a long time been 
a matter of scholarly and political controversy. Most Western accounts have 
credited the outcome of Communism and the defeat of the Soviet bloc mainly 
to the intensive East-West dialogue, of which the Vatican’s Ostpolitik, initiated 
in the early 1960s by Pope John XXIII, had been a major element. According to 
this, the progressive foreign policy pursued by the Vatican and West Germany 
had no alternative: it was the only way they could help East-European Catholic 
communities to survive Communism.2 Hungarian and other Eastern European 
1 To be quoted with author’s permission only!
2  For a general overview, see STEHLE, Hansjakob: Geheimdiplomatie im Vatican. 
Die Päpste und die Kommunisten. Zürich, Benziger, 1993. See also Card. Casaro-
li’s memoirs – CASAROLI, Agostino: Il martirio della pazienza. La Santa Sede e 
i paesi comunisti (1963 – 1989). Torino, Einaudi, 2000 and his apologetic portrait 
by Santini – SANTINI, Alceste: Casaroli, l’uomo del dialogo. Roma, San Paolo 
Editore, 1993. A positive assessment of the Vatican’s Ostpolitik in the scholarly 
work by Melloni – MELLONI, Alberto: L’altra Roma. Politica e S. Sede durante 
il Concilio Vaticano II (1959 – 1965). Bologna, Il Mulino, 2000  and MELLONI, 
Alberto (ed): Il fi lo sottile. L’Ostpolitik vaticana di Agostino Casaroli. Bologna, 
Il Mulino, 2006, and also BARBERINI, Giovanni: L’Ostpolitik della Santa Sede. 
Un dialogo lungo e faticoso. Bologna, Il Mulino, 2007. On the origins of left-wing 
catholic movements in the 1960s Italy, see SARESELLA Daniela: Dal Concilio 
alla contestazione. Riviste cattoliche negli anni del cambiamento. Brescia, Mor-
celliana, 2005. A more sceptical approach is in RICCARDI, Andrea: Il Vatica-
no e Mosca, 1940 – 1990. Laterza, Roma-Bari, 1992; perceptive critiques on the 
dominant interpretation of the II Vatican Council as a radical breakthrough for the 
Catholic Church in MARCHETTO, Agostino:  Il Concilio Ecumenico Vaticano 
II. Contrappunto per la sua storia.  Città del Vaticano, Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 
148
accounts have been always been rather critical on the aims and the results of 
the Vatican’s opening to the East.3 On the basis of extensive fi eldwork in the 
Hungarian state security archives, I will analyse the long-term effects that the 
Ostpolitik – strongly infl uenced by the intelligence services of the Soviet bloc 
– had on the Hungarian Catholic movement and bilateral relations between the 
Holy See and a moderate Communist regime. My point is that a mostly Catho-
2005, a senior Vatican diplomat now serving as Secretary of the Pontifi cal Council 
for Pastoral Care of Migrants and Itinerant Peoples. Long-term negative effects of 
the Communist religious policy on Poland and Hungary are briefl y summarized 
by ORLANDI, Fernando: Východné cirkvi : čo kážu, a čo robia. EAST,  13/2007, 
pp. 22 – 29.  
3   See Card. Mindszenty’s memoirs – MINDSZENTY, József: Memorie. Milano, 
Rusconi, 1975 (or. ed. 1974) and his diary of the years spent in the US Embassy 
in Budapest – MINDSZENTY, József: Napi jegyzetek. Amerikai követség 1956-
1971. Szerk. Csonka Emil. Vaduz, 1979; from a similar perspective ADRIÁNYI, 
Gábor: A Vatikán keleti politikája és Magyarország 1939 – 1978. Budapest, Kairo-
sz, 2004 and MÉSZÁROS, István: Egy “kultusz” a XXI. században. A Mindszenty-
tisztelet története (1975 – 2005). Budapest, Kairosz, 2005. A good analysis of the 
Hungarian participation in the II Vatican Council in MÁTÉ-TÓTH, András: A II. 
Vatikáni zsinat és a magyar elhárítás (2003, manuscript, available at http://www.
vallastudomany.hu/Members/matetoth/vtmtadocs/m-ta_II_vatikani_zsinat). An 
authoritative account on the relationship between Hungary and the Vatican during 
the 1960s, based on an impressive documentation, in SZABÓ, Csaba: A Szentszék 
és a Magyar Népköztársaság kapcsolatai a hatvanas években. Budapest, Szent 
István Társulat-Magyar Országos Levéltár, 2005. On the infi ltration of the secret 
police into the Hungarian Catholic Church before 1956, see KAHLER, Frigyes: 
ÁVH történelmi olvasókönyv 4. Adalékok az egyházüldözés történetéhez. Buda-
pest, Kairosz, 2007; for the following period see the recollection by LÉNÁRD, 
Ödön – TÍMÁR, Ágnes – SZABÓ, Gyula – SOÓS, Viktor Attila (eds): Utak és 
útvesztők. Budapest, Kairosz, 2006; an acquitting stance in TOMKA, Ferenc: 
Halálra szántak, mégis élünk (Egyházüldözés 1945 – 1990 és az ügynökkérdés.) 
Budapest, Szent István Társulat, 2005; a balanced account on post-1956 trends 
in the Hungarian Catholic world in BAUQUET, Nicolas: Entrer en kadarisme: 
l’Église catholique hongroise de la révolution à la «consolidation». COMMU-
NISME, 88/2006-2007, pp. 91 – 106; TABAJDI, Gábor – UNGVÁRY, Krisztián: 
Állambiztonsági tanulmányok. Manuscript, Budapest, 2007 – radical critics in the 
chapter devoted to the Catholic Church of their general work on the Hungarian 
state security under the Kádár regime (2007), pp. 286 – 313. On Hungarian-Ita-
lian diplomatic relations from 1956 to the second half of the 1970s, see PANKO-
VITS, József: Fejezetek a Magyar-olasz politikai kapcsolatok történetéből (1956 
– 1977). Budapest, Gondolat, 2005, and in particular chapter 5 on Mindszenty’s 
case.
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lic, still multi-confessional and quite secularised country like Hungary was the 
best ground for such a tactical and at times ideological compromise: 
1) After a fi rst period of confrontation and sufferance, most of the hie-
rarchy (cardinals, bishops, professors of theology, Catholic journalists 
and intellectuals) and an infl uential minority of rank-and-fi le priests 
and believers came to accept the necessity to cooperate with the Kádár 
regime. The price for this choice has been very high: in no Eastern 
European communist country had the Catholic movement suffered 
such a serious erosion of its moral authority as the Hungarian Catholic 
Church, a direct consequence of the deep, long-standing and humilia-
ting compromise with an atheist state.
2) From the early 1960s, when diplomatic talks between Hungary and 
the Vatican were relaunched, the „liberal” Kádár regime was assigned 
by the Warsaw Pact  special intelligence tasks regarding Italy and the 
Vatican. Ideological subversion, diplomatic talks and intelligence ac-
tivity appeared as the different facets of the same sophisticated strate-
gy. Hungarian politicians and state security offi cers in charge of  diplo-
matic missions were polite, spoke good Italian and made reference to 
values that were very popular in post-1968 Europe: the deepening of 
the co-existence; the struggle against the conservative wing within the 
Catholic Church; and the necessity of a constant East-West „dialogue” 
to be promoted by  left-wing, pacifi st,  profoundly anti-American and 
pro-Soviet new Catholic movements. Due to the existence of a strong 
Communist party and to the rise of left-wing Catholic dissent, Italy 
proved to be the ideal ground for this kind of soft ideological work. 
Sources used
For my research I have made use of recently declassifi ed fi les of the Hun-
garian foreign intelligence, preserved in the State Security Archives of Buda-
pest. The most relevant source, without doubt, is a so-called objektum dosszié,4 
4   „Objektum dosszié” was a collection of different materials referring to a single 
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opened in 1971 and closed as late as the 25 February 1993,5 which includes 
all relevant operative information obtained from and concerning  the Vatican’s 
Secretariat of State. This general fi le was given the „Nérók” code name.6 Ten 
out of the 16 original volumes are missing from the State Security Archives. 
The documentation available to scholars encompasses vols 11-16 (ca. 1 300 
pages) covering the period between 1972 and 1985. These fi les originally had 
been classifi ed as „state secret” (államtitok) until 2071, but have been declassi-
fi ed and made available for research under the effects of the Law 3/2003. 
Further information came from some of the personal fi les  of foreign in-
formants of the Hungarian Intelligence Service („Mozart” operative fi le 1962 
– 1965, „Kerekes” operative fi le 1966 – 1968, „Blanc” operative fi le 1972 
– 1979), from already published documents – in particular the „Canale” (Cha-
nnel) objektum dosszié, referring to an earlier stage of the Hungarian-Vatican 
relations between 1962-65. A further source of interest were the fi les of the of 
the residency (from the Russian rezidentura7) called „Világosság” (Lightness), 
created by the Hungarian intelligence within the State Offi ce of Religious Af-
fairs in 1967 with the aim of improving  the operative work among the “Catho-
lic reaction”8.
However, one must be aware that while top-secret records now available 
in Hungary or Poland describe in detail the anti-religious strategies adopted 
case/problem/territory, which was used for operative purposes by intelligence of-
fi cers.
5   I asked archivists and other scholars the possible reason for this: the unanimous 
answer was that the operative fi le may have been closed well later than 1989. We 
can reasonably suppose that the Hungarian intelligence activity inside the Vatican 
did not stop with the end of Communism, due to the fact that in the fi rst years of 
transition the I (Foreign) Directorate responsible for the Vatican line (section III/I-
4-A) had not been dismantled because of „national security reasons”.
6   Állambiztosági Szolgálatok Történeti Levéltára, Budapest (ÁBTL): fond 3.2.5, 
fi le 0-8-552, vol. 11 – 16.
7   Quoting from a KGB lexicon: „An Intelligence unit under deep cover in a target 
country, where it conducts Intelligence work from legal of illegal positions”. Lexi-
con of KGB terms. Impedian Report No. 152, 115. A copy available at CSSEO 
library (Levico Terme, Italy).
8   SOÓS, Viktor Attila – SZABÓ, Csaba: „Világosság”. Az Állami Egyházügyi Hi-
vatal és a hírszerzés tevékenysége a katolikus egyház ellen. Budapest, Új Ember-
Lénárd Ödön Közhasznú Alapítvány, 2006.
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by Moscow and its allies, they cannot shed light on the policy and strategies 
adopted by the Vatican – carried out by a notoriously secretive bureaucracy. 
Moreover, unless the Secret Archives of the Holy See disclose the key docu-
ments of the period after the II World War, we will not be able to solve the puz-
zle, but merely to propose a partial and likely biased point of view, i.e. the one 
suggested by these documents available in the post-communist archives. 
Internal factors: the Kádár regime’s new Catholic policy 
The fi rst question I would address is how the Hungarian intelligence bodies 
– which Moscow viewed as  peripheral and ineffi cient when compared to the 
Czechoslovakian, the East German or even the Bulgarian secret services – came 
to be considered  by the late 1960s an effi cient instrument for the Soviet bloc’s 
ideological offensive against the West. From 1948 to 1956 the Communist-
Catholic relationships in Hungary did not differ from the more general East-Eu-
ropean pattern. After Card. Mindszenty’s show trial in 1949, hundreds of priests, 
friars, professors of theology and simple believers were arrested and sentenced 
to hard prison terms; every offi cial contact with the Vatican was strictly forbid-
den; and properties and schools belonging to the Catholic Church were confi s-
cated. The fey institutions left immediately became part of the show-dressing 
policy pursued by the Rákosi regime, which tried to build up a loyalist Catholic 
movement, but its leaders were immediately excommunicated by Pope Pius 
XII in 1950. After a moment of relative tranquillity between 1955-57, a second 
wave of arrests and political trials of clerics took place (along with similar ones 
in the Soviet Union and Romania) between 1958 and 1961, at the peak of the 
anti-religious campaign led by Nikita Khrushchev.
The reconstruction of the informative network damaged by the 1956 revo-
lution was given high priority by the „reformed” secret services. Starting from 
1957, a great number of priests were recruited by the secret police, with most 
of them having a history of brief or longer periods of detention. Due to the fact 
that no new bishops had been appointed until a partial bilateral agreement was 
signed on 15 September 1964, the aim of the authorities became the selection 
of a new Catholic elite from this pool of „trustworthy” priests: the deal was 
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career prospects and the possibility of travelling abroad in exchange for secret 
assistance and public loyalty.
By combining punishment and social mobility, the Kádár regime set the 
basis for further compromises. The second attack against the Catholic Church 
ended the movement of collective resistance in Hungary. A sociological analy-
sis on the Hungarian Catholic clergy’s involvement shows that while the early 
total percentage of agents and sources among the nearly 4 000 priests did not 
exceed 6-7%9, this rate later rose to 60-70% (over 80% in the mid-1980s) in the 
cases of bishops and leading professors of theology (rectors, visiting scholars 
to the Hungarian Pontifi cal Institute in Rome (Pápai Magyar Intézet – PMI10). 
Almost every bishop appointed after 1964 had previously been linked (or was 
still linked at the moment of his appointment) to the different branches of the 
Hungarian intelligence (i.e. section III/I-4 of the Ministry of Interior dealing 
with Italy and the Vatican, residencies all over the world, the hypertrophic Di-
rectorate III/III-1 of MI dealing with the „Catholic reactionaries”). The career 
of this new „cooperative” clergy – or better, the making of a carefully selected 
counter elite – was monitored and, in fact, directed by the Hungarian secret 
service and the State offi ce for Cults, in order to replace the old-styled, uncom-
promised icons like Cardinal Mindszenty; Lajos Shvoy, Bishop of Székesfe-
hérvár; József Pétery, the impeditus Bishop of Vác; Norbert Legányi, the abbot 
of Pannonhalma; or Arthur Schwartz-Eggenhoffer, appointed by the Vatican 
apostolic administrator of Esztergom (without the agreement of Hungarian au-
thorities) after cardinal Mindszenty fl ed to the US Embassy. People like József 
Ijjas (appointed Bishop of Kalocsa in 1964), Pál Brezanóczy (appointed Bishop 
of Eger in 1964), theologian Imre Timkó (appointed Greek-Catholic Bishop 
of Hajdudorogh in 1975), Kornél Pataki, György Zemplén, and Árpád Fábián 
9   According to András Tóth-Máté, in 1958 out of 4663 active clergy (3,7%) only 
171 agents were active. Not surprisingly, the highest rate can be found in Bu-
dapest (45 out of 480 priests). In the 1970s and 1980s the percentage of clergy 
collaborating with the Hungarian secret services nearly doubled due to the recruit-
ment of young theologians and priests by the III/I Directorate (external service).
10  TABAJDI, Gábor – UNGVÁRY, Krisztián: Állambiztonsági tanulmányok. Manu-
script, Budapest, 2007, pp. 290 – 293.
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became the best possible ambassadors for the new socialist Hungary during and 
in the wake of the II Vatican Council.11   
Early intelligence activity against the Vatican 
Between 1948 and 1963 there were no offi cial contacts between the Vatican 
and the Hungarian People’s Republic. The offi cers working on the Catholic 
problem in the Centre and in the small-sized residency in Rome were given the 
task of monitoring the activity of Hungarian political refugees in Italy. Special 
attention was paid to those churchmen attending their service in Rome who 
refused to come back to Hungary after the Communist takeover in 1948. In 
the early 1950s the ÁVH had opened an informative fi le, codenamed „Hon-
talanok12” (Stateless), against prominent conservative clerics in Rome such as 
József Zágon, who left Hungary in 1949 and organized the Hungarian „Actio 
Catholica” in Rome, becoming fi rst the rector of  and later a member of the 
Curia (secretary of the Pontifi cal Council for the Pastoral Care of Migrants 
between 1970 and 1975); Mons. István Mester, the vice-rector of the PMI and 
the spokesman of the Hungarian Bishop’s Conference until 1964; the Piarist 
priest Vince Tomek, appointed Father General in 1947 and acting as such until 
1967; and fi nally Mons. Sándor Csertő, a senior member of the powerful Prop-
aganda Fidei Congregation, appointed Promotor Iustitiae (the third most im-
portant position) by its conservative prefect, the Archbishop of Zagreb Šeper in 
1969.13 Although in 1952 a general fi le named “Vatican’s Secretariat of State” 
was opened, it was impossible to directly penetrate the Vatican until the death 
of Pope Pius XII.14
11  Ibidem, pp. 296 – 300.
12  ÁBTL, 3. 1. 8. Cs – 687.
13   This provoked negative reactions in Budapest by the ÁEH and the offi cers han-
dling „Világosság” residency within it. See SZABÓ, Csaba: A Szentszék és a Ma-
gyar Népköztársaság kapcsolatai a hatvanas években. Budapest, Szent István 
Társulat-Magyar Országos Levéltár, 2005, pp. 397. In the „Canale”, „Honta-
lanok” and „Nérók” fi les one fi nds many references to the intensive cultivation of 
these „hostile” clerics. In the early 1970s the Hungarian intelligence tried a more 
direct approach to Csertő, who refused any cooperation with the state security. 
ÁBTL, 3.2.5, 0-8-552/15, pp. 92 – 97.
14   The existence of an objektum-dosszié named „Pápai Államtitkárság” had been 
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By stimulating rivalry and misunderstandings, the Hungarian state security 
attempted – without much success until 1964 – to weaken those Hungarian-
born clerics belonging to the conservative, openly anti-communist wing, and 
to undermine their position as mediator between the Holy See and the Hungar-
ian Church. By a curious accident, the emigrant-run PMI and the state-owned 
Hungarian Academy of Rome had to share the magnifi cent Palazzo Falconieri 
located in Via Giulia, next to Piazza Farnese and Campo dei Fiori and located 
only a few hundred meters from the Vatican.
A turning-point in Vatican-Hungarian relations came when the new Pope 
John XXIII called for a Vatican Council on 25 January 1959.15 It was an utmost 
diffi cult moment for all East-European Catholic Churches, hit by the inten-
sive anti-religious campaign launched by Nikita Khrushchev one year before. 
It was only after the fi rst offi cial invitations were posted to Hungarian bishops 
(June 1962), that the Hungarian party and intelligence offi cials focussed on 
the question. At fi rst, Cardinal Mindszenty and some other bishops, whose ap-
pointment had not been recognized by the Communist state, did not receive 
invitations, probably due to the internal confl ict within the Curia between the 
declining conservatives, willing to openly condemn Communist regimes, and 
the rising progressive wing – supported by the Pope himself – seeking to fi nd 
a compromise with them. When the „reparatory” invitation to old conservative 
bishops was posted, it was too late: the Hungarian delegation had been set up by 
the Offi ce for Religious Affairs (ÁEH), in cooperation with the III/III („internal 
reaction”) and the III/I (foreign intelligence) Directorates. Six informants and 
several operative agents, who served under diplomatic cover in the Hungarian 
Legation in Rome, joined the high-level delegation which travelled to Rome in 
October 1962. Among the informants who had received special training before 
leaving, one can fi nd future bishops, leading theologians and catholic journa-
recently discovered by Hungarian scholar István Bandi. The 10 volume fi le is sup-
posed to have preceded „Nérók” (which starts from vol. XI) but this is unfortu-
nately not available in the state security archive. According to the staff’s opinion, 
most of this part of it could have got lost or destroyed during or immediately after 
the 1956 revolution.
15   SZABÓ, Csaba: A Szentszék és a Magyar Népköztársaság kapcsolatai a hatvanas 
években. Budapest, Szent István Társulat-Magyar Országos Levéltár, 2005, pp. 20.
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lists.16 For the second session, in 1963, the proportion of agents rose to 9 out of 
15 members. Intelligence reports showed scarce satisfaction for the work of the 
Hungarian spies who were the fi rst to work in the Vatican,17 most of them had 
been simply unable to remain undiscovered.18 
Nevertheless, it was during the II Vatican Council that the Hungarian intelli-
gence offi cers, learning from their errors, laid the foundations for further opera-
tive work against the Vatican. To better implement the new policy of opening 
and dialogue, shortly before the beginning of the Council, in mid-1962 a new 
ambassador was appointed to Italy, the open-minded and clever József Száll. 
He was followed by young and well-trained (but ideologically infl exible) state 
security offi cers. The Hungarian Legation (from 1964 the Embassy) and the 
Rome residency staff could get more easily acquainted in Vatican affairs under 
diplomatic cover by regularly meeting with cardinals, members of the Curia, 
and civil servants of the staff of the Secretariat of State and new bodies such as 
the Secretariat for the Promotion of the Unity of Christians, founded in 1960 
and the Secretariat for Non Believers founded in 1965, both aimed at stimu-
lating East-West ecumenical dialogue.19
16   See MÁTÉ-TÓTH, András: A II. Vatikáni zsinat és a magyar elhárítás (2003, 
manuscript,  available at http://www.vallastudomany.hu/Members/matetoth/vt-
mtadocs/m-ta_II_vatikani_zsinat) and SZABÓ, Csaba: A Szentszék és a Magyar 
Népköztársaság kapcsolatai a hatvanas években. Budapest, Szent István Társu-
lat-Magyar Országos Levéltár, 2005.
17   According to István Bandi, the fi rst reports regarding Hungarian clerics emigrated 
to Italy date back as early as 1950, but agents working for the Hungarian state 
security in the fi rst 1950s did not represent the „offi cial” Hungarian church like 
their later fellows.  
18   SZABÓ, Csaba: A Szentszék és a Magyar Népköztársaság kapcsolatai a hatvanas 
években. Budapest, Szent István Társulat-Magyar Országos Levéltár, 2005, pp. 
143 – 144.
19   From 1960 to 1965 the resident was János Bogye, codenamed Tarnai, who was to 
be appointed chief of the Hungarian intelligence in 1976. Other valuable offi cers 
proved to be Major György Földes, codenamed Dér, the referent for the Catholic 
issue of the Rome residency between 1962-66, appointed later chief of section III/
I-8, charged with the training of illegals, who was also until 1982 the „handler” 
of the Vatican line in the Centre (service III/I-4-A); Major Ferenc Garzó, codena-
med Fekete, who joined the Rome residency in 1962 under diplomatic cover, 
becoming a key element of the Vatican line and the resident from Rome between 
1973-77; László Róbert, codenamed Rezső, offi cially the MTI press agency and 
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In September 1962 offi cer Fekete, who worked in the Rome residency (then 
dependent on the III/I-3-D service – Vatican), met a German-born journalist 
(Hamburg, 1900), Dr. Fritz Kusen, who had been living in Italy since the early 
1930s and had been working in the German section of  Radio Vaticana after 
1947 and was in contact with the West German Embassy of Rome, as well. 
According to the information collected in his personal fi le, Kusen  (codenamed 
„Mozart”) had also been tasked with diplomatic missions by the Canaris ser-
vice during the II World War; while after 1945 he had had good contacts with 
a number of East-European and Arab diplomats. The Hungarian intelligence 
was sure he was not only a double agent, but was being used by the Vatican 
to spread both true and false information.20 So he never became an „agent”, 
refusing to be paid for his reports and oral information he released between 
1963-64, but his expertise was valuable to the Hungarian intelligence and party 
leadership engaged in bilateral talks with the Vatican. Kusen had excellent ac-
cess to internal information. He was a close friend of Father Sebastian Tromp, 
the personal secretary of the leading conservative Cardinal Ottaviani, a fi erce 
enemy of the opening to Moscow. During a confi dential talk with him on 14 
April 1963, Kusen got to know that the visit to the Pope of the „Izvestija”  edi-
tor and Nikita Khruschev’s son-in-law Adjubei, on March 7, had not been an 
accident but had to be placed into a broader perspective. Shortly after the pub-
lication of encyclical letter Pacem in Terris, on April 11 – in which the head of 
the Catholic Church renounced to voice anti-communism,21 Pope John XXIII 
arranged with Soviet authorities a private visit for Khruschev to Rome and to 
the Vatican on June 15. Although the plan has never been made public – and the 
Pope’s death on June 3 made it fail – it provoked deep concern not only in the 
Vatican, among leading conservative circles, but also in the USA and in West 
Germany, where chancellor Adenauer reacted furiously to the bad news coming 
from Rome.22 
the newspaper Népszabadság correspondent to Rome between 1961 and 1966.
20  ÁBTL, fond 3.2.4.  K-383 („Mozart” operative fi le, 1962 – 1965), pp. 137 – 138.
21   MELLONI, Alberto: L’altra Roma. Politica e S. Sede durante il Concilio Vatica-
no II (1959 – 1965). Bologna, Il Mulino, 2000, pp. 179.
22  ÁBTL, fond 3.2.4. K-383, pp. 118 – 119.
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Thanks to „Mozart” and the Hungarian agents „Kékes Pál” and „Molnár 
Béla”,23 and legal channels such as Italian journalists Alceste Santini24 and 
Valerio Occhetto, the Hungarian intelligence and party leadership managed to 
run the fi rst talks between a Communist state and the Holy See from a very 
favourable position. While the Vatican’s envoys to Budapest (the Archbishop 
of Vienna, Franz König, visited Card. Mindszenty at the end of April 1963, 
followed on May 7-9 by Mons. Agostino Casaroli, the special envoy the Secre-
tariat of State25) had only a superfi cial knowledge of the internal situation 
in Hungary, the Kádár regime had detailed information about the increasing 
strength – stimulated both by internal factors and by the mounting activity of 
Warsaw Pact’s intelligence – of the intentions of the progressive wing within 
the Vatican, whose aim was to persuade Card. Mindszenty to give up his per-
sonal resistance, to leave Budapest and to step down from his post of  Primate 
of Hungary, allowing the Hungarian church to „live on and work”.26 
The policy of distension and dialogue inaugurated by Pope John XXIII was 
carried on by his successor, Paul VI, and despite Mindszenty’s refusal to leave 
Hungary without a complete rehabilitation, after one year of intensive bilateral 
talks a partial agreement was signed in Budapest on 15 September 1964 by 
Agostino Casaroli and József Prantner, the head of the ÁEH. The agreement 
23   „Kékes Pál” was the codename of Pál Brezanóczy (1912 – 1972), the Apostolic 
Administrator of Eger since 1959, who was appointed bishop on 28 October 1964. 
„Molnár Béla” was the codename of Vid Mihelics, a leading Catholic journalist 
and the editor of Vigilia review. 
24   Santini was a well-reputed vaticanista of the Communist newspaper l’Unità and 
also gave valuable support (not as an agent, but a confi dential source) to the Hun-
garian state security. For over 35 years, until 1990 the lead the press service of the 
Hungarian Embassy to Rome, being also in friendly relations with Casaroli and 
other Vatican diplomats belonging to the progressive wing. 
25   Five days before Casaroli’s arrival to Budapest, on 2 May 1963, section III/III-
2-a of the Ministry of Interior arranged an operative plan on his surveillance 
which involved 17 agents in Budapest, Győr, Szeged, Esztergom, Nyíregzháza 
and Székesfehérvár. SZABÓ, Csaba: A Szentszék és a Magyar Népköztársaság 
kapcsolatai a hatvanas években. Budapest, Szent István Társulat-Magyar Orszá-
gos Levéltár, 2005, pp. 97 – 99.
26   MELLONI, Alberto: L’altra Roma. Politica e S. Sede durante il Concilio Vatica-
no II (1959 – 1965). Bologna, Il Mulino, 2000, pp. 172.
158
should be considered one of the most successful act of Kádár’s regime for three 
reasons:
1) As a consequence of the communist regime’s lobbying for the ap-
pointment of politically loyal churchmen to replace uncompromised 
bi shops, a great number of bishops and auxiliary bishops working 
for both the internal service (Directorate III/III) and the foreign in-
telligence (Directorate III/I) were appointed between 1964 and 1969, 
when the Hungarian Bishop’s conference fell under a complete con-
trol by the state.27 For Moscow, Hungary became a positive model 
for the state-church relationships in the socialist bloc. Even if reli-
gious harassments (censorship, intimidation, arrests, trials) were not 
stopped, and a new wave of repression took place in early 1965, only 
a few  months after the agreement, the Vatican’s diplomacy preferred 
to downplay their signifi cance in order to maintain good relations with 
the Hungarian state.28  
2) In 1965 the Hungarian state took over the PMI, located at the second 
fl oor of Palazzo Falconieri in Rome. Emigrant clerics were removed 
from their position and replaced by a new staff (rector, vice-rector, 
a half dozen professors and 4-5 students per year, whose salary or grant 
was allotted by the Hungarian state). According to archival records, all 
27   ADRIÁNYI, Gábor: A Vatikán keleti politikája és Magyarország 1939 – 1978. 
Budapest, Kairosz, 2004, pp. 70 – 71. According to a prudent estimation, in 1987 
no less then 10 out of 13 members of the Hungarian Bishops’ Conference (HBC) 
had been in the past or were still agents and informants of the state security. On 
the case of Card. László Paskai, the President of the HBC between 1986 and 1990, 
see UNGVÁRY, Krisztián: Mozgástér és kényszerpályák. Ecsetvonások egy egy-
házfő életrajzához. ÉLET ÉS IRODALOM, 2006/5.  
28   In the mid-1960s (the best example could be his speech at Domitilla’s Catacombs, 
on 12 September 1965) he looked more uncompromising towards Poland, which 
he strongly desired to visit despite the offi cial refusal by local authorities. On Paul 
VI’s position toward Communism see MELLONI, Alberto: L’altra Roma. Poli-
tica e S. Sede durante il Concilio Vaticano II (1959 – 1965). Bologna, Il Mulino, 
2000, pp. 352 – 357 and pp. 368 – 371; CASAROLI, Agostino: Il martirio della 
pazienza. La Santa Sede e i paesi comunisti (1963 – 1989). Torino, Einaudi, 2000, 
pp. 67 – 76.
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rectors leading it between 1965 and 1987 had been skilled agents of 
the Hungarian intelligence, trained to entertain political discussions, 
or to use „technique instruments” such as portable microphones.29 
From 1965 to the late 1970s, the proportion of informants among visi-
ting professors and students – most of them attending the Gregorian 
and the Lateran Pontifi cal Universities, or the Collegium Germanicum 
– was lower, but still exceeded 50%.30 PMI’s rectors and professors 
were a major instrument of Kádár’s policy towards the Vatican, en-
joying unrestricted access to the Vatican diplomats dealing with East-
European affairs: Agostino Casaroli and Giovanni Cheli until the early 
1970s; later on Luigi Poggi, Gabriel Montalvo, Angelo Sodano, Ivan 
Dias and John Bukovsky. 
3) Already in 1964 the PMI was given by the state security the task of 
selecting the future Catholic elite in Hungary, that is the medium and 
upper ecclesiastical positions. In 1976 a report by the Hungarian intel-
ligence praised the loyalty of former students and stated that the repro-
duction of a new Catholic elite was a permanent task for the state secu-
rity, and could only be achieved by preventing „undesirable persons” 
from getting a chance for career in Rome. Following the „prospective” 
view adopted after 1964, along the Hungarian Cultural Institute, the 
PMI was to became the basis of the Hungarian „soft” intelligence in 
Italy.31
29   György Zemplén (codenamed Karl Wittmann, 1965 – 1968. Work fi le nr. Mt-
567/1-2.), Árpád Fábián (Ludwig Beron, 1969 – 1972. File Mt-807/1-3), István 
Bagi (Blanc, 1973 – 1979. File Mt-1109/1-4), Dankó István (Körmöczi, 1980 – 
1987. File M-35493). Although few information is still available about the agent’s 
network of PMI in the late 1980s, on the basis of the closing date of the „Nérók” 
operative fi le (1993) one has to suppose that the methodic penetration of it had not 
stopped in 1987. 
30   BANDI, István: Adalékok a Pápai Magyar Intézet történetéhez, állambiztonsági 
megközelítésben. EGYHÁZTÖRTÉNETI SZEMLE, 2007/1. (http://www.uni-
miskolc.hu/~egyhtort/cikkek/bandiistvan.htm).
31   Operative fi les concerning the PMI were collected into a dossier codenamed „Pal-
ota” (Palace). ÁBTL, 3. 1. 5. O-20011. 
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1967 – 1971: Solving Mindszenty’s question
The year 1967 marked a new turning-point for the Hungarian effort to in-
fi ltrate the Vatican. On 26 March Pope Paul VI’s encyclical letter Populorum 
Progressio was published. The Catholic church openly faced modernity and 
stood for social and political rights, especially in Africa and Latin America, 
claiming that evangelization and a call for social justice were consistent aims. 
On 4 July 1967 Mons. Casaroli, who expressed his own sympathy for the cause 
of the socialist countries, was appointed Secretary of the Congregation for Ex-
traordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs (renamed shortly after Public Affairs Council, 
equivalent to a foreign ministry), and on 16 July he was also created Bishop.32 
Only four years after his fi rst visit to Budapest, he had become the chief archi-
tect of the Vatican’s Ostpolitik. The reaction of Moscow was immediate. On 
24-27 July senior offi cials of Soviet Bloc intelligence agencies met in Buda-
pest to discuss „work against the Vatican; measures to discredit the Vatican 
and its backers, and measures to exacerbate differences within the Vatican and 
between the Vatican and capitalist countries”; the meeting was followed by ac-
tive measures aimed at discrediting and dividing the Uniate Church and at pene-
trating the Vatican.33 According to Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, 
in 1968-69 an ambitious program personally supervised by the new chief of 
KGB, Yurii Andropov, aimed at infi ltrating all major sections of the Vatican bu-
reaucracy. After the successful takeover of PMI and the marginalisation of the 
Catholic emigration to Rome, Hungary was given the further task to creep into 
all Congregations and the Secretariat of State, then run by French cardinal Jean 
32   Casaroli’s biographic data in CASAROLI, Agostino: Il martirio della pazienza. 
La Santa Sede e i paesi comunisti (1963 – 1989). Torino, Einaudi, 2000, XXXI-
XXXV.
33   The quotation has been taken from Christopher Andrew-Vasili Mitrokhin (1999), 
pp. 651. A more detailed Czechoslovak account in KAPLAN, Karel: Tĕžká cesta. 
Spor Československa s Vatikánem 1963 – 1973, Brno 2001, Centrum pro stu-
dium demokracie a kultury, pp. 145 – 152. See also HAĽKO, Jozef: A magyar 
és a csehszlovák titkosszolgálat együttműködése a II. Vatikáni Zsinat „operatív 
fedolgozásában”. REGNUM. MAGYAR EGYHÁYTÖRTÉNETI VÁZLATOK, 
1-2/2006, pp. 81 – 88. References to the 1967 meeting can be found also in the 
archives of the former Securitate: ACNSAS, fond Documentar, dosar 69, vol. 2, 
2-21. f. No record of the meeting has yet been found in the Hungarian archives.
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Villot, and religious orders, especially the Jesuit one, whose members were 
running the Vatican Radio and most of the Italian Catholic press (Osservatore 
Romano and Avvenire).34
On the external plan, in order to implement bilateral cooperation, a necessary 
step in order to carry out the Vatican’s master plan to establish normal diplo-
matic relations, the Hungarian state and the Holy See did not hesitate to remove 
obstacles to „full blown” Ostpolitik. The fi rst victim was Vienna’s Archbishop, 
Franz König, himself a protagonist of the early Ostpolitik but more sceptical of 
Kádár’s goodwill than most Vatican staff. In the late 1960s, Card. Mindszenty’s 
situation remained the last contested issue in a delicate negotiation involving 
Hungary, the Vatican and the USA. In order to increase Mindszenty’s isolation, 
in September 1967 Hungary asked Washington and Vienna to suspend Card. 
König’s frequent visits to Mindszenty.35 According to a report by the foreign 
section of MSZMP’s Central Committee, König’s private talks were causing 
embarrassment and widespread protest among the Hungarian Bishops Confe-
rence.36 As a result, Card. König had to interrupt his parallel diplomacy and did 
not play any signifi cant role during the last round of bilateral talks of 1971.37
In the same period, Mons. Luigi Bongianino, a skilled diplomat of the Sec-
retariat of State and in charge of  Hungarian affairs since 1963, paid his fi rst 
34   The most important success for the Hungarian intelligence in this period was the 
appointment to defi nitor generalis of the Franciscan order of Father Ferenc Király 
Pacifi k (codenamed Falter Ludwig. File Bt-1308/1-3 and Mt-387/1), who kept 
this position between 1967 and 1973. In the 1970s the most important channels 
were „Bertold”, an Italian journalist who worked in the foreign desk of the ANSA 
press agency, the still unidentifi ed „Krammer”, „Engel”, „Kimmel Johann”, „Ne-
mere” and „Sigmund Raymund”.
35   SZABÓ, Csaba: A Szentszék és a Magyar Népköztársaság kapcsolatai a hatvanas 
években. Budapest, Szent István Társulat-Magyar Országos Levéltár, 2005, pp. 
308 – 309.
36   ADRIÁNYI, Gábor: A Vatikán keleti politikája és Magyarország 1939 – 1978. 
Budapest, Kairosz, 2004, pp. 75 – 76. König paid visit to the seriously ill Mind-
szenty on 7 May and 23 June 1967.
37   From 1967 to 1971, König visited Mindszenty only once, in October 1969. SOÓS, 
Viktor Attila – SZABÓ, Csaba: „Világosság”. Az Állami Egyházügyi Hivatal és 
a hírszerzés tevékenysége a katolikus egyház ellen. Budapest, Új Ember-Lénárd 
Ödön Közhasznú Alapítvány, 2006.
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individual visit to Hungary38 in March 1967 with the task of examining some 
possible candidates for appointment as bishop. Bongianino surprised his Hun-
garian fellows, „Kerekes”39 and „János Zoltán”40 for his independent-minded-
ness and „conspiracy”. The report on his visit to Budapest, Eger, Szeged and 
Kalocsa underlined the political risk represented by Bongianino – who did not 
care too much of offi cial accounts and called every cleric to confi dential talk 
which had shocking effects on them: people kept crying, their voice trembled.41 
Despite the lack of documents on the Hungarian intervention, their complaint 
had immediate effects: after a short time Bongianino, who only age 40, was 
dismissed from diplomatic service and later created Bishop (March 1968).42 
His successor was Mons. Giovanni Cheli, a senior diplomat who entered 
the Roman Curia in 1967 as a protégé of Casaroli. He fi rst visited Hungary 
in September 1968,43 and with his friendly style immediately gained the trust 
of his Hungarian counterpart. After his visit to Hungary in November 1969 
the Archbishop of Kalocsa, József Ijjas, told agent „Kerekes” that Cheli was 
„much more diplomatic and sympathetic to us.”44 In the following years Che-
li’s positive attitude to socialist Hungary was repeatedly praised by party and 
intelligence reports. He played a key role in the solution to the troubled Mind-
szenty affair, travelling several times to Budapest and always surrounded by 
undercover security offi cers and infl uential agents. Under the pressure of the 
Hungarian state and the progressive wing of the Curia, a reluctant Pope Paul 
VI agreed to solve the question, and communicated the Vatican’s decision to 
38  Before that he had only joined Agostino Casaroli in 1965 and 1966.
39   Kornél Pataki was the personal secretary of Szeged’s bishop József Udvardy, then 
was appointed Bishop of Győr (1975 – 1990). His „work fi le” in ÁBTL 3.1.2.  M-
36278/1-2.
40  György Zemplén, the rector of PMI between 1965 and 1968.
41   Report by „Kerekes” agent on Luigi Bongianino’s visit to Hungary. M-36278/2, 
pp. 86 – 92.
42   He was sent to the small town of Alba, in Piedmont, then was moved to Vercelli 
(1970) and Tortona (1975).
43   SOÓS, Viktor Attila – SZABÓ, Csaba: „Világosság”. Az Állami Egyházügyi Hi-
vatal és a hírszerzés tevékenysége a katolikus egyház ellen. Budapest, Új Ember-
Lénárd Ödön Közhasznú Alapítvány, 2006, document n. 3.
44   Report by „Kerekes” on Giovanni Cheli’s visit to Hungary (18-19 November 
1969). M-36278/2, pp. 188.
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bring the old Primate to Rome to the Hungarian Foreign Minister, János Péter 
(himself a former Calvinist bishop), on 16 April 1971. According to Péter’s re-
port for the MSZMP Political Committee, during the meeting the Pope showed 
little concern for Mindszenty’s fate, calling him „a victim of history who is 
causing indeed much diffi culty both to the Vatican and the Hungarian govern-
ment.”45 Five days later, a secret agreement was signed by the representative of 
the Vatican, Giovanni Cheli, and the president of ÁEH, Imre Miklós, accord-
ing to which the Vatican agreed to revoke excommunications infl icted in 1958 
to three Hungarian churchmen (Miklós Berestóczy, Richárd Horváth and Imre 
Várkonyi) who had been elected to the Communist parliament in spite of offi cial 
prohibition.46 Accor ding to the evaluation given by the Hungarian Communist 
Party, this decision was important for  Hungarian foreign policy too, because it 
made easier „cooperation between left-wing movements and progressive Catho-
lic forces in the West.”47 On the Vatican’s demand, the formal rehabilitation 
of collaborationist priests – supposed to be welcomed by conservative public 
opinion as a betrayal – was made public only on 13 October 1971. On that 
date Card. Mindszenty already was in Rome, after the Vatican’s representative 
Giovanni Cheli had signed on 9 September the agreement that made it possible 
for Mindszenty to leave Hungary. Conditions imposed on Mindszenty’s status 
were humiliating: he was denied juridical rehabilitation, so thus leaving Hun-
gary as an infractor, and he was also prevented from dealing with Hungarian 
affairs. Moreover, the Vatican agreed to let him retire from Primacy after he 
had reached 80 years (that is to say in 1972).48 These points were made clear by 
the Vatican to Mindszenty only on 10 October 1971 by the Apostolic Delegate 
to Vienna. So after only four weeks spent in Rome, Mindszenty decided to 
move to Vienna, where he died in 1975. His departure under these conditions 
45   SZABÓ, Csaba: A Szentszék és a Magyar Népköztársaság kapcsolatai a hatvanas 
években. Budapest, Szent István Társulat-Magyar Országos Levéltár, 2005, pp. 
408.
46   BALOGH, Margit – GERGELY, Jenő: Egyházak az újokori Magarországon 1790 
– 1992. Kronológia. Budapest, História-MTA Törtétettudományi Intézete, 1993, 
pp. 344.
47   ADRIÁNYI, Gábor: A Vatikán keleti politikája és Magyarország 1939 – 1978. 
Budapest, Kairosz, 2004, pp. 117 – 118.
48  Ibidem, pp. 213.
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was welcomed as a major success by the Hungarian state security: agreements 
signed were in line with Hungarian interests and were testimony that „progres-
sive Catholic forces” were gaining ground even into the Vatican.49    
In the very important period following the fi rst operative meeting on the 
Vatican in 1967, Hungary was able to consolidate its positive image, also con-
tributing to the progressive marginalisation of internal ideological enemies 
(Mindszenty) as well as external ones (Cardinals Ottaviani, Benelli, the Croat-
born Franjo Šeper, and Münich’s Card. Döpfner). On the internal plan, a key 
role was played by a special residency called „Világosság” set up in November 
1968 within the State Offi ce of Cults and belonging to the fourth section of 
III/I Directorate, in charge of Italy, the Vatican and Israel. Major József Orosz, 
codenamed Vági, was appointed chief of the fi ve-member staff. Sándor Rajnai, 
the chief of the Hungarian foreign intelligence directorate, tasked Orosz to keep 
and work out confi dential information coming both from Hungarian churchmen 
travelling to Rome (skilled informants or „confi dential sources”, that is up to 
say involuntary confi dants) and from Vatican diplomats visiting Hungary. Dur-
ing such occasions, particular attention was paid to the special envoy to Hun-
gary, Giovanni Cheli, and his assistant, Mons. Gabriel Montalvo, both of whom 
were very close to Mons. Casaroli and were intensively cultivated through the 
so-called „black channel”.50 For over three years – working together with the 
other sections of intelligence, the State Offi ce of Cults and the Propaganda 
section of the Party’s Central Committee – the residency also helped „prepare” 
Hungarian bishops for their regular visits to Rome, in order to smuggle in dis-
senters on the Ostpolitik and strengthen the Vatican’s belief that the Hungarian 
question had been settled.51
49   ÁBTL 3.2.5  0-8-552/12, 45-53. Report by section III/I-4 on current trends of the 
Vatican’s foreign policy. Budapest, 2 October, 1972. 
50   ÁBTL 2.2.1  Operatív nyilvántartás II/2 –7. doboz (Operative fi les – Giovanni 
Cheli). Montalvo dealt with Eastern European affairs between 1964 and 1974, 
then became apostolic delegate to Nicaragua, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya until 
1986, and later pro-nuncio to Yugoslavia (1986-96) and ambassador to the USA 
(1999-2005). Further biographic details in „Gabriel Montalvo; Archbishop, Vati-
can Envoy to U.S”. Washington Post, 4 August 2006.
51   On the „Világosság” residency, see SOÓS, Viktor Attila – SZABÓ, Csaba: „Vilá-
gosság”. Az Állami Egyházügyi Hivatal és a hírszerzés tevékenysége a katolikus 
egyház ellen. Budapest, Új Ember-Lénárd Ödön Közhasznú Alapítvány, 2006.
165
Hungary’s agent network and targets in the Vatican during the 1970s
The operative effi ciency and political infl uence of the Hungarian intelli-
gence towards the Vatican reached its peak throughout the 1970s, before the 
natural turning point represented by the shocking election of the Polish cardinal 
Karol Wojtyla (16 October 1978), whose effects on the Cold War’s dyna mics 
were immediate and consistent. After cracking the resistance of the Hunga rian 
Catholic movement and signing favourable agreements on the Mindszenty case, 
in the early 1970s the Hungarian authorities felt ready to intensify their intelli-
gence activity within the Vatican and Italy as a whole. Due to growing political 
instability and economic crisis, Italy continued to be regarded by Moscow as 
the most vulnerable Western country, where operative interests could have been 
easily achieved. 
From 1972/73 onwards, the „Vatican line” became a source of major suc-
cess for the Hungarian intelligence, led from 1967 to 1976 by Sándor Rajnai 
and afterwards, until November 1989, by János Bogye, who himself had been 
a legal resident in Rome during the 1960s and spoke perfect Italian and Spa-
nish.52 In the Centre, one of the most important sections of the First Directorate 
(III/I-453) dealt with Italy and operated on three lines/services.
•  III/I-4-A: intelligence against the Vatican line and the Catholic emigra-
tion to Western countries54
52   UNGVÁRY, Krisztián: Kik voltak, mit akartak? Egyenes út a csúcsra: Harangozó 
Szilveszter. Egy állambiztonsági főcsoportfőnök karrierje. RUBICON, 2007/1, 
pp. 34 – 35. 
53   For a clear account on the Third Chief Directorate of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs see URBÁN, Aladár: Kádár politikai rendőrsége. A BM III. (Állambizton-
sági) Főcsoportfőnökség felépítése és működése. RUBICON, 2002/6-7, pp. 58 
– 65.
54   Offi cers leading the Vatican  service (III/I-4-A) from 1972 to the early 1980s 
were capt. György Kósa, sub-lieutenant János Knopp,  lieutenant-colonel Ferenc 
Garzó and sub-lieutenant János Rostási. Section III/I-4 was led by colonel  János 
Bogye, lieutenant-colonel György Földes, lieutenant-colonel Ferenc Zsigmond, 
then Gábor Patkó and Oszkár Kiss. 
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•  III/I-4-B: intelligence against NATO targets in Italy (with particular 
reference to the NATO Defence College of Rome55)
•  III/I-4-C: intelligence activity against Zionist movements and Israeli 
targets in Italy    
The high operational level reached by the Vatican service can be fi rst ex-
plained through some statistical data. In the second half of the 1970s one can 
estimate that state security staff working on the Vatican reached its peak, with 
some dozens of well-trained, Italian-speaking intelligence offi cers working 
around the world under diplomatic cover or „illegally” for III/I-8 service. The 
highest concentration was in Italy, where the Rome main residency hosted 6 – 7 
offi cers dealing with the Vatican out of a total number of 21 – 22 staff (12 of 
which were operative offi cers).56 
According to a report about the period from January 1973 to June 1977, 
Hungarian intelligence collected 860 pieces of intel and reports of the Vatican 
line, 686 of which had been evaluated as „usable” by section III/I-6 (documen-
tations, analysis and forecasts). Two-thirds of this information (565 by number) 
came from different residencies; the most successful proved to be the intelli-
gence from Rome, from where 546 reports, secret documents and information 
had been sent (461 of which usable, 85 unusable), but further intelligence came 
also from Vienna (during Card. Mindszenty’s stay, until 1975, from his cir-
cle and later from Card. König’s entourage), Paris (where the French Bi shop’s 
conference was monitored until 1977), Köln (whose Archbishops were two 
infl uential conservative churchmen Josef Frings, 1942-69, and Joseph Höff-
ner, 1969-8757), Zürich and also New York (the UN’s residency), where Hunga-
55  ÁBTL, 3.2.6.  8-346/1-4 (Nato Defence College, 1968 – 1988). 
56   Figures are taken from ÁBTL, 3.2.6.  0-200/IX, pp. 29 and pp. 77 – 78 (Velence 
operative fi le – Hungary’s embassy to Rome, 1976 – 1987). To make a compari-
son, KGB’s „legal” residency in Rome had a 35 staff and was running over just 20 
agents. ANDREW, Christopher – MITROKHIN, Vasili: Mitrochinov archív. KGB 
v Európe a na Západe. Londýn, Penguin, 1999, pp. 620.
57   Pope Benedict XVI had been a consultant for thological questions of Card. Frings 
at the II Vatican Council, and later a leading professor of Theology in Münster 
and Tübingen, well known to the Hungarian state security for his conservative 
stance after 1968. 
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rian intelligence offi cers could also met with Vatican diplomats working in the 
USA. 
Another 295 pieces of information (216 of which were evaluated as use-
ful to operative tasks) had been collected through the network agency. By this 
time, the number of agents followed exceeded 20, most of them living and wor-
king in Rome. More notably, in the mid-1970s most candidates and confi dential 
sources were Italian or people working for the Vatican, and provided Hungarian 
intelligence with secret information on the Vatican’s Ostpolitik, and political 
and personal confl icts which could be exploited according to the Soviet bloc’s 
interests.58 According to available data, the fl ow of reports further intensifi ed 
after 1978. In 1980-81 the Rome residency forwarded the Centre a monthly 30 
– 35 reports. Most of them were referring to the Vatican’s foreign policy and 
to the main operative targets, such as the Radio Vaticana (codenamed Son), the 
PMI (codenamed Palota) and the Jesuit Order (codenamed Fekete Ház).59 
In the second half of the 1970s, the resident and its operative offi cers ruled 
a complex, multi-level network in Rome. The highest grade was represented by 
„hivatásos munkatárs” (skilled agent – HMT), „titkos munkatárs” (TMT – se-
cret agent) and „hírszerző ügynök (HÜ – intelligence agent). All TMT and most 
HMT and HÜ were Hungarian-born (staff of PMI and the Hungarian Cultural 
Institute, journalists, intellectuals and scholars), and also got a special training 
before moving to Italy. The main operative basis against the Vatican was Palaz-
zo Falconieri, where the PMI operated: here even the meeting rooms and the of-
fi ces were microphoned,  allowing the intelligence service to make the best use 
58   ÁBTL, 3.2.5  0-8-552/13, pp. 159 – 173. The most important foreign agent wor-
king for the Hungarian intelligence in Italy was „Von Schiller”, a West German 
journalist accredited to Italy. Among his confi dential sources (certainly unaware 
of his real aims) one could fi nd „T-1” – a diplomat of the FRG Embassy, „V-2” 
– the general assistant of the Jesuit Order and „V-4”, a high-ranking offi cial of 
the Secretary for the Christians’ Unit. Other valuable sources were „Bertold”, 
a journalist for the ANSA press agency, „Braun Franz”, a Rome-based journalist 
of Radio Free Europe, „Heine”, director of the left-wing oriented ADISTA Catho-
lic press agency, „Ágel”, an Italian MP belonging to the left-wing of the Italian 
Socialist Party, „Müde”, „Scherring” and „Böhm” (a Cistercian father teaching at 
Lateran University). A confi dential contact was also the well-known Hansjakob 
Stehle, a senior correspondent to Rome for „Die Zeit” and ARD and author of 
books about the Vatican’s Ostpolitik.
59  ÁBTL, 3.2.5  0-8-552/14, pp. 165 – 169.
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of offi cial ceremonies, concerts and other cultural events. On the second level 
one could fi nd clerical agents (priests, friars, theologians, civil servants within 
universities and congregations), also of Hungarian background. The third level, 
by no means the most successful one, was represented by all those Italian and 
Vatican sources, who intentionally or unintentionally (when provoked by intel-
ligence staff following  operative psychological techniques such as the „black 
channel”) proved less valuable to the Hungarian intelligence by giving com-
promising or confi dential information. Most of them were sincerely convinced 
about Hungary’s commitment to friendly bilateral relations with the Vatican 
and Italy and did not regard Kádár’s Hungary as a truly Communist regime.
According to archival records, due also to technological progress during the 
1970s (e.g. the creation of an electronic database), the cooperation between dif-
ferent branches of the state security reached a high operational level. „Legal” 
residencies (like Rome’s, which depended on section III/I-4) exchanged their 
information not only with the Centre (sections III/I-4, III/I-6, as well as the „il-
legal” III/I-8 and „Akadémia” chief residency, charged with the monitoring of 
cultural relations with the West, whose activity remains still unexplored), but 
also with section III/III-1, in charge of the „Catholic problem” for the First Di-
rectorate, the Second Directorate of counterintelligence taking care of foreign 
citizens visiting Hungary, the Foreign Ministry and the State Offi ce of Cults.60 
„Nérók” fi les show a regular exchange of operative information and personal 
data on foreign clerics with some East European secret services. An intensive 
bilateral cooperation was further established with Poland and the GDR, whose 
diplomats and/or intelligence offi cers working in Rome regularly met with their 
Hungarian fellows. The Hungarian intelligence had been used as a main refe-
rence for those Warsaw Pact countries – such as Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and 
the Soviet Union – whose bad or inexistent relations with the Vatican made it 
quite diffi cult to penetrate its secrets. By contrast, the intelligence services of 
the different Warsaw Pact countries shared very few operative links with Ro-
60   Every visit to Hungary of Vatican diplomats was jointly prepared the three Direc-
torates and the State Offi ce of Cults. During Giovanni Cheli and Angelo Sodano’s 
visit to Hungary in April 1972, for example, a one-day trip to lake Balaton was 
organised for them in order to permit security offi cers to secretly enter their hotel 
room in search for confi dential papers to copy. ÁBTL, 3.2.5.  0-8-552/11, pp. 31 
– 35. 
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manian foreign intelligence, which operated independently and showed much 
interest towards Italy and the Vatican itself.61
Full-blown Ostpolitik and fi rst signs of crisis
From the second half of the 1960s the Warsaw Pact countries made an ex-
traordinary effort to undermine the Vatican’s positions, to weaken its moral 
infl uence and to ideologically reorient it from a pro-Western, theologically and 
socially conservative stance towards ideological nonalignment between capi-
talism and socialism. While reading self-confi dent Hungarian reports about 
serious political damages infl icted to the „clerical reaction” (both in the Vati-
can and in Hungary) by the active measures taken throughout the 1970s, one 
wonders how trustful and reliable they should be considered from a historical 
perspective. Looking at Ostpolitik’s development in the last years of the Paul 
VI papacy, it seems that the way Hungary could penetrate and infl uence the 
Vatican’s policy towards the Socialist bloc was quite similar to KGB and Stasi 
joint operations and operative combinations against leading West German poli-
ticians like Willy Brandt and Helmut Schimdt.62 In both cases, the success did 
not rely on direct recruitment of targets, yet on the creation of stable channels 
inside their staff of advisors in order to collect information and infl uence their 
decisions through positive propaganda and disinformation.
Favourable contingency also helped to spread the perception among Catho-
lic believers that the 1968 global turbulences were a clear demonstration of 
economic, psychological and even moral crisis plaguing the US-led Western 
capitalist world. Intelligence reports based on confi dential talks with Vatican 
diplomats could not miss a comparison between a „secularised” West, where 
the Catholic world looked divided by theological quarrels and dissenting 
groups that questioned the moral authority of the Pope, and the East, where 
Catholicism had survived to through Communism, preserving devotion and 
61   I would like to thank Chris Davis for his perceptive comments made on this part 
of the paper.
62   ANDREW, Christopher – MITROKHIN, Vasili: Mitrochinov archív. KGB v Eu-
rópe a na Západe. Londýn, Penguin, 1999, pp. 594 – 595.
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obedience to Rome.63 Two years later, in 1972 the Hungarian intelligence came 
to know that during a confi dential meeting of the Congregation for the Pub-
lic Affairs (the Vatican’s „Foreign Ministry” led by Card. Casaroli from 1968 
to 1978) the Vatican’s French Secretary of State, Card. Jean Villot, had been 
even more explicit, recognizing that socialist regimes unintentionally erected 
a wall against the diffusion to Eastern Europe of materialism and hedonism.64 
A gene ral report released in October 1972 by the Hungarian secret service on 
the Vatican’s foreign policy trends underlined that the Holy See was now giving 
priority to the collection of reliable information from beyond the Iron Curtain 
and to the upgrading of the hierarchy (a most striking question for Czechoslo-
vakia, where most bishops appointed by Rome had not been recognized by the 
state). The KGB had also warned all socialist countries that the Vatican had 
recently set up a master plan for „ideological subversion”, motivated offi cially 
by the common struggle for peace and disarmament and to be realised through 
a more intense contact with local authorities and private citizens. Nevertheless, 
the Hunga rian intelligence showed no particular concern for this alarm. On the 
contrary, internal divisions within the Curia were appreciated, where the pro-
Secretary of State Card. Giovanni Benelli and ultraconservative Card. Ottaviani 
led the opposition to Ostpolitik, targeting not only Villot but also Casaroli and 
his „liberal” staff.65 According to Villot, the Catholic Church should avoid com-
mitting with socialism the same error previously made with capitalism, from 
which the Vatican seemed to be too dependent. The Holy See should preserve 
its „neutrality” and, indeed, look with „sympathy” to socialism and help elevate 
the moral level of East-European societies without undermining the political 
legitimacy of ruling Marxist parties. Finally, although the Kádár regime was 
concerned with the spread of basis communities being in open dissent with 
63   SZABÓ, Csaba: A Szentszék és a Magyar Népköztársaság kapcsolatai a hatvanas 
években. Budapest, Szent István Társulat-Magyar Országos Levéltár, 2005, pp. 
38 and pp. 400 – 401 (report of „Világosság” residency of the visit to Budapest of 
Agostino Casaroli and Giovanni Cheli on January 1970).
64  ÁBTL, 3.2.5.  0-8-552/12, pp. 164 – 166.
65   ÁBTL, 3.2.5.  0-8-552/15, pp. 62. According to a report by the Rome residency of 
November 1974, rumours were heard in the Curia about the removal of Agostino 
Casaroli, who had entered into confl ict with Card. Benelli and was expected to be 
appointed as the Archbishop of Turin.
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collaborationist clergy, well-informed intelligence could report that according 
to Villot the Vatican would not have allowed the existence of any dissenting 
community in the socialist world, where the reconstruction of an offi cially reco-
gnised structure became the fi rst – and sometimes the only possible – aim for 
Vatican diplomacy.66 
According to Agostino Casaroli, reported by Polish Vice-Minister of Fo-
reign Affairs, Pope Paul VI intended to avoid any major confl ict with the socia-
list camp. Casaroli added: he was personally convinced that within ten years 
Catholicism and socialism would have become the dominant „ideologies” all 
over the world, and both needed to fi nd a common ground.67
A year marked by international tension mainly due to the fi rst oil crisis, 1973 
was also a troubled period for the Vatican, which seemed to realise formerly de-
clared intentions to distance itself from the United States and play an active and 
independent role in the European security conference.68 On 7 February 1973 
the Hungarian intelligence came to know that two CIA agents working under-
cover as „minutanti” in the Vatican Secretariat of State had been recently un-
masked and sent on punishment to Uganda and South Africa as Vice Nuncio.69 
Some months later, on 28 July 1973, the Osservatore Romano announced with 
a brief communiqué that the high-ranking diplomat Giovanni Cheli, charged of 
contacts with Hungarian offi cials,70 had been appointed Apostolic Delegate to 
66   ÁBTL, 3.2.5.  0-8-552/12, pp. 45 – 53. Report by section III/I-4 on guidelines 
of the Vatican’s foreign policy. Budapest, 2 October 1972. See also 3.2.5. 0-8-
552/12, pp. 164 – 166. Rome, 7 February 1974. Report by agent „Engel” on inter-
nal confl icts into the Vatican.
67   ÁBTL, 3.2.5.  0-8-552/12, pp. 157 – 159. Record of the meeting between the 
Polish Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Hungarian Ambassador to Po-
land. Warsaw, 30 November 1973.
68   ÁBTL, 3.2.5.  0-8-552/12, pp. 69. Intelligence report by agent „Nemere”. Rome, 
23 November 1972; ÁBTL, 3.2.5.  0-8-552/12, pp. 70 – 74. Report by agent „Von 
Schiller” talking to confi dential source „V-2”. Rome, 15 December 1972. 
69   ÁBTL, 3.2.5.  0-8-552/12, pp. 94.
70  Besides taking part in offi cial talks with Hungarian representatives, Cheli held 
also private and strictly confi dential talks on 8 January and 29 May 1973, in a res-
taurant in Rome with undercover offi cer György Földes, codenamed Dér. During 
these talks, the main topic of which was Mindszenty’s case, Cheli also offered to 
give Hungarian diplomats fi rst-hand information on any further developments of 
the Vatican’s Ostpolitik. Reports by Dér in ÁBTL, 3.2.5.  0-8-552/12, pp. 77 – 82 
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the United Nations, in New York. In spite of Vatican discretion, the Hungarian 
intelligence informed the Centre and the party leadership of Cheli’s removal as 
early as 18 July, well before the news had been made public. Hungarian sources 
were also informed on the true reason for his removal, due to a denunciation 
against him presented to Pope Paul VI by Hungarian-born emigrant clerics, led 
by Károly Fábian, a senior editor of Radio Free Europe, who openly accused 
Cheli of being „a Communist agent”.71 The rumour was confi rmed by Cheli 
himself, who confi dentially admitted to agent „Blanc” (the PMI’s rector, István 
Bagi) that the real target of the conservative offensive was Casaroli,  put under 
pressure by the Pope who – always trying to balance between the two wings 
– was forced to sacrifi ce him in order to keep the line.72 Cheli’s indiscretion was 
useful to the Hungarian intelligence, which realised the political risks linked to 
top-level confi dential sources. Cheli was replaced by Mons. Luigi Poggi, ano-
ther senior diplomat belonging to Casaroli’s wing but much less an enthusiast 
of Hungarian religious policy than Cheli.73 
In 1973, ten years after the intensive, apparently one-sided opening towards 
the East, the Vatican’s progressive wing had to face the same accusation of 
inconsistency made by a younger generation of diplomats to the old conserva-
tives in the 1950s: neither resistance nor dialogue seemed to have any major 
infl uences on the internal life of the Communist regimes, though the dialogue 
did help them increase their legitimation and international weight. Casaroli 
and pp. 108 – 113. 
71   ÁBTL, 3.2.5.  0-8-552/11, pp. 142 – 144. Report by section III/I-6 of the removal 
of the Vatican diplomat dealing with Hungarian affairs. Budapest, 19 July 1973.
72  Ibidem, pp. 143.
73   Along with other Vatican diplomats such as John Bukovsky and Francesco Co-
lasuonno, Luigi Poggi can be found on a list of former Hungarian agents known 
as “Szakértő 90”, which was fi rst made public in 2005 (http://www.angelfi re.
com/zine2/szakerto90). According to available records („Nérók” fi les and the his 
personal fi le: ÁBTL 2.7.1 NOIJ Névmutató Karton – Luigi Poggi) any direct link 
between Poggi and the Hungarian intelligence has to be excluded. Along with 
many other staff of the Secretariat of State, Poggi was indeed subject to intense 
cultivation by the Hungarian intelligence, but also used his frequent talks to Hun-
garian diplomats and offi cers to exchange information and enforce the Vatican’s 
position.
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himself showed dissatisfaction with the results of his own policy.74 According 
to a Hungarian intelligence report, during the annual conference of the Apos-
tolic Delegates held in 1974 in Frascati, near Rome, Casaroli had to point out 
that, in spite of popular expectations in the West, dialogue should not mean 
„ideological compromise” with Communism, and in spite of its „disappointing 
results” this strategy should not be abandoned because „so long as we dialogue, 
East-European Churches are not at risk.”75
A similar policy was quite easy to follow in Hungary, where the intensive 
cooperation between the Catholic Church and Kádár’s regime had no more 
obstacles after Mindszenty’s forced resignation76 (18 December 1973), which 
made it possible in 1976 to appoint as Hungary’s primate one the most collabo-
rative bishops, László Lékai. It was much more diffi cult for the Polish Catholics 
and the West German Bishop’s Conference to yield to the demands of Vatican’s 
realpolitik. In February 1974 Hungarian intelligence registered with satisfac-
tion the unprecedented confl ict between the Polish Bishop’s Conference and the 
Vatican Secretariat of State on Casaroli’s offi cial trip to Poland, made on at the 
invitation of the Polish government. After Casaroli preached his sermon in St. 
John the Baptist Cathedral of Warsaw, praising the ongoing reconciliation be-
tween the state and the Church, Cards. Wyszyński and Wojtyła openly accused 
him of „weakening the positions of the Polish Bishop’s Conference” and of 
„provoking misunderstanding among the Polish clergy.”77 They also boycotted 
the reception organised by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs as a sign of protest. 
According to a Polish diplomat, Warsaw was aware that Casaroli needed well-
sounding promises in order to face critics, and agreed to consider his proposal 
to establish normal diplomatic relations; but the Polish government had no 
74   See Agostino CASAROLI, Agostino: Il martirio della pazienza. La Santa Sede e 
i paesi comunisti (1963 – 1989). Torino, Einaudi, 2000, chapters IX and XI on his 
diplomatic efforts in Czechoslovakia and Poland. 
75   ÁBTL, 3.2.5.  0-8-552/12, pp. 216 – 224. Report by section III/-6 on new trends in 
Vatican’s policy. Budapest, 7 June 1974.
76   Consistent material on the operative measures taken by the Hungarian authorities 
and the Vatican to positively infl uence public opinion can be fi nd in the „Nérok” 
fi les, as well as „Blanc” (ÁBTL, 3.2.3. Mt-1109/2) and „Kerkai” operative fi les 
(ÁBTL, 3.2.3.  Mt-988/1).
77   ÁBTL, 3.2.5.  0-8-552/12, pp. 199 – 202. Report of section III/I-4 on Vatican-
Polish talks. Budapest, 22 February 1974. 
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serious intention to modify bilateral relations with the Vatican, already consi-
dered to be satisfying and favourable to Warsaw.78 The Polish journalist wor-
king in Rome, Dominik Morawski, also told the Hungarian agent „Nemere” 
that the Polish government now feared the sudden death of frequently-ill Pope 
Paul VI, an event which could damage the work already done by Casaroli.79 
In this period, Polish-Hungarian cooperation on religious matters became so 
intensive that the two ministers of Foreign Affairs, Stefan Olszowski and János 
Péter, met in early September 1973 to discuss further relations with the Vatican, 
and Olszowski complained about Wyszyński’s un-collaborative stance, which 
strinkingly diverged from „harmonic coexistence” in Hungary.80 Tension be-
tween the Vatican and the Polish clergy reached a peak when the Secretariat of 
State (on Casaroli’s initiative) heavily censored a speech, very critical of Ost-
politik and the negative effects of „dialogue” on the East-European churches, 
that Card. Wyszyński was intending to address to the Sinod of Bishops held in 
Rome in October 1974.81 Confi dence by father Jozef Penkowsky to agent „Kim-
mel Johann” was interpreted in Budapest as another sign that „operative work” 
on the Vatican had been successful: stopping critical voices against Ostpolitik 
by direct intervention of the Eastern bloc’ countries was no longer needed: the 
Vatican provided for it on its own.
The long way to the breakthrough
By 1975 the crisis with Polish clergy and a diplomatic confl ict with West 
Germany on the diplomatic recognition of East Germany – along with a suc-
cession of failures with Czechoslovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia and the USSR 
– came to undermine the legitimacy of the Vatican’s Ostpolitik. The Hungarian 
intelligence had reached excellent positions in the Vatican, where the „double 
loyalty” of the Hungarian Bishop’s Conference to the Communist state and the 
78  Ibidem, pp. 200.
79   ÁBTL, 3.2.5.  0-8-552/12, pp. 225 – 228. Report by „Nemere”. Rome, 10 June 
1974.
80   ÁBTL, 3.2.5.  0-8-552/15, pp. 39 – 41. János Péter’s report on talks with the Polish 
minister of Foreign Affairs. Budapest, 13 September 1973.
81   ÁBTL, 3.2.5.  0-8-552/12, pp. 266 – 268. Report by „Kimmel Johann”. Rome, 14 
November 1974.
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Pope was highly appreciated, and also substantially contributed to the mar-
ginalization of the „clerical reaction” within and outside Hungary. Top-level 
Hungarian politicians came to visit Hungary and the Vatican: in 1975 Prime 
Minister György Lázár and in June 1977 János Kádár, who had been the Min-
ster of Interior during the Mindszenty trial.82 Kádár’s visit to the Vatican raised 
only isolated protest and represented by no means a small triumph for Hunga-
ry’s „fuzzy socialism” and its soft, still very effi cient intelligence. But the over-
optimistic accounts on the Vatican’s commitment to Ostpolitik could not avoid 
mentioning that after the Helsinki Conference and the election of Jimmy Carter 
to the US presidency something had changed in international politics. 
An intelligence report in 1975 made an excellent forecast on possible suc-
cessors to Pope Paul VI, putting the lesser-known Card. Wojtyla among the 
three or four most probable choices, along with Card. Ugo Poletti and two Ger-
man-speaking foreign clerics: Berlin’s Alfred Bensch, sincerely committed to 
the Ostpolitik, and Vienna’s Franz König, who had played a major role during 
an early stage of the opening to East but who in the 1970s had become more 
and more sceptical about it. In the case of the election of Krakow’s Archbishop 
Karol Wojtyla, a choice that the Hungarian intelligence identifi ed as „possi-
bly the most hazardous”, „major consequences for world politics” and deep 
changes were forecasted, with Poland at the centre of this.83 After reaching full 
profi ciency into Vatican affairs, the Hungarian secret services were capable of 
predicting the coming end of Ostpolitik’s golden age, but not strong enough to 
prevent it.    
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